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1 Introduction
Pacholik-Żuromska  takes  issue  with  both  my
proposal to tone down Searle’s Background Hy-
pothesis  in  terms  of  the  distinction  between
producers  and mere  consumers  and my claim
that part of the background of intentionality is
itself intentional (albeit in a derived sense). In
her introduction she kindly raises the question
“who has made the mistake—the speaker (pro-
ducer,  author)  or  the  hearer  (consumer,
reader),” provided that “the interpreter of the
article  […]  was  to  misunderstand  the  article”
(Pacholik-Żuromska this collection, pp. 2–6). I
answer that in case of doubt it is the author of
the target article, of course, who has made the
mistake.  As  the  formulation  of  her  question
shows, Pacholik-Żuromska has indeed misunder-
stood  a  central  distinction,  i.e.,  that  between
producer and mere consumer. However, before I
take the opportunity to correct this and other
misunderstandings, I would like to comment on
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two ideas and suggestions by Pacholik-Żurom-
ska that I find interesting and well worth pursu-
ing further.
2 The background of self-identification
The  first  suggestion  concerns  our  ability  to
“grasp the literal meaning of the indexical ‘I’.”
(Pacholik-Żuromska this collection,  p.  4)
Pacholik-Żuromska contends that this may re-
quire, on the part of both speaker and hearer,
“a capacity to identify themselves as subjects of
a certain state, which is a capacity belonging to
the  unintentional  background.”  (Pacholik-Żur-
omska this collection, p. 4) I agree that (1) the
same  sort  of  capacity  is  in  play  with  both
speaker and hearer, and that (2) this capacity
belongs to the background. I reject the claim,
though,  that  this  capacity  is  non-intentional.
Let me explain. 
Ad  (1): In  The  Thought Gottlob  Frege
contends that only the speaker herself can grasp
the  proposition  expressed  by  the  sentence  “I
have been wounded,” as used in a soliloquy, and
that the hearer therefore has to grasp a differ-
ent proposition, provided by the utterance con-
text,  in  order  to  understand  a  corresponding
sentential utterance, such as the proposition ex-
pressed by “She who is speaking to you at this
moment  has  been  wounded”  (Frege 1956,  p.
298).  This  flies  in  the  face  of  the  Husserlian
conception  of  linguistic  communication  from
which I start out in my article, which requires
that the hearer ascribes the right meaning-be-
stowing act to the speaker in a case of success-
ful communication; which means, in the case at
hand,  that  he  ascribes  to  the  speaker  what
Pacholik-Żuromska aptly calls  a self-identifica-
tion  (rather  than  an  act  of  speaking  to  the
hearer, as Frege has it). In fact, this is precisely
the way Husserl himself describes what happens
in the case of the correct interpretation of “I”-
utterances: 
Es ist klar: Wer ‘ich’ sagt, nennt sich nicht
nur selbst, sondern er ist sich dieser Selb-
stnennung  auch  als  solcher  bewußt,  und
dieses  Bewußtsein  gehört  wesentlich  mit
zum Bedeutungskonstituierenden des Wor-
tes  ‘ich’.  Das  aktuelle  Sich-selbst-Meinen
fungiert […] so, daß darin sein Gegenstand
als  Gegenstand  eines  Selbstmeinens  ge-
meint […] ist. […] Der Hörende versteht es,
sofern es ihm Anzeige für dieses ganze Be-
wußtseinsgebilde ist, also der Redende für
ihn  als  jemand  dasteht,  der  sich  selbst,
und zwar als ‘ich’ nennt, d.i. sich als Ge-
genstand seiner als Selbsterfassung erkan-
nten Selbsterfassung nennt.1 (Husserl 1984,
p. 813)
Thus,  if  the  speaker  asserts  “I  have  been
wounded,”  she  presents  herself  as  someone
who refers to herself as referring to herself (or
as  meaning  herself/having  herself  in
mind/thinking  of  herself),  in  order  to  state
about herself that she has been wounded; and
the  hearer  understands  this  assertion  if  he
takes the speaker to refer to herself as refer-
ring to herself and to assert about herself that
she has been wounded. I regard this metarep-
resentational  view  of  the  meaning-bestowing
acts  underlying  the  assertive  use  of  “I”-sen-
tences as quite plausible. After all, if someone
claims, say, “I have a broken leg,” then she eo
ipso knows that she  refers to herself  by “I;”
she  could  instantly  add:  “I  am  speaking  of
myself.” (Contrast  this  to  a case in  which a
speaker unknowingly looks at herself in a mir-
ror and exclaims “She has a broken leg.” See
Beyer 2006, pp. 33 ff.) Incidentally, this view
fits in well with a dispositionalist higher-order
judgment theory of  consciousness,  which im-
plies  that  (thanks  to an underlying,  “pre-re-
flective” structure of inner time-consciousness)
“I”-awareness  disposes  its  subject  to  judge
that  she  herself  is  thinking  of  herself  (see
Beyer 2006, pp. 33 ff.).2 If  a mental disposi-
tion such as this is actualized (which is not re-
1 The English translation is as follows: “Clearly, if someone says ‘I’, he
does not only refer to himself, but he is also aware of this referring
to himself  as such,  and this awareness builds an essential  part of
what constitutes the meaning of the word ‘I’.  The current act of
meaning oneself is functioning […] in such a way that in the course of
it its [intentional] object is […] being meant as the object of an act of
meaning oneself. […] The hearer understands it, if he takes it as an
indication for the whole  structure of consciousness just described,
that is to say, if the speaker is regarded by him as someone who
refers to himself precisely as ‘I’, i.e., as someone who refers to himself
as the object of his recognition of himself recognized as a recognition
of himself.” (My translation.)
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quired for self-identification), then the result-
ing (“reflective”) “I”-judgment is based upon,
and  epistemically  motivated  by,  a  (“pre-pre-
dicative”) act of referring to oneself  as refer-
ring to oneself. 
Ad (2): In order for the hearer to ascribe
such a meaning-bestowing act of self-identific-
ation to the speaker,  he does not, of course,
have  to  actualize  his  own  capacity  for  self-
identification, in the sense of actually thinking
of himself  as thinking of himself.  But in the
absence of this capacity he would be unable to
ascribe such an act to the speaker, at least if
we  follow Husserl  and Edith  Stein  and con-
ceive of third-person act ascriptions as based
on empathy, where the ascriber mentally sim-
ulates  the  cognitive  situation  of  the  target
person (see Beyer 2006, ch. 3). So I agree with
Pacholik-Żuromska  that  an  element  of  the
background  (notably,  the  capacity  for  self-
identification) is required for the ability to un-
derstand “I”-utterances. However, I deny that
this capacity is completely non-intentional. It
is precisely a mental disposition that is actual-
ized (if it gets actualized) in  intentional con-
sciousness,  namely  in  pre-predicative  acts  of
referring  to  oneself  as oneself—acts  which
may, but need not, give rise to corresponding
“self-reflective” higher-order judgments. 
3 The intersubjective dimension of 
intentionality
Another  interesting  suggestion  made  by
Pacholik-Żuromska  concerns  the  relationship
between  intentionality  and  intersubjectivity.
She claims that “[i]ntentionality is  a relation
between minds and the world” (Pacholik-Żur-
omska this collection, p. 5), thus subscribing
to an externalist  conception of  intentionality
(which I share), and goes on to characterize it
as “a social phenomenon, developed and prac-
ticed through interactions with other minds”
(Pacholik-Żuromska this collection,  p.  5).
Pacholik-Żuromska  refers  to  Tomasello,
Rakoczy, and Davidson in this connection, but
(her  ascription  to  Husserl  of  the  thesis  that
2 This may also fit in with the Brentanian conception of consciousness
that Pacholik-Żuromska alludes to in section 4.
subjects  can  “live  a  solitary  life”  notwith-
standing, which I regard as a misreading; this
collection, p. 8) she could also have referred to
Husserl  here.  In  the  second  volume  of  his
Ideas  Pertaining  to  a  Pure  Phenomenology
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy  (Ideas
II), Husserl presents a detailed analysis of the
intersubjective,  reciprocal  constitution  of  in-
tentional objects that belong to a “communic-
ative environment” and are thus immediately
perceivable  as  valuable  heating  material,  for
example: 
Kohle z.B. sehe ich als Heizmaterial; ich
erkenne  es  und  erkenne  es  als  dienlich
und  dienend  zum  Heizen,  als  dazu
geeignet  und dazu bestimmt Wärme zu
erzeugen.  […]  Ich  kann [den  brennbaren
Gegenstand] als Brennmaterial benutzen,
[…] er ist mir wert mit Beziehung darauf,
daß  ich  Erwärmung  eines  Raumes  und
dadurch  angenehme  Wärmeempfindun-
gen für mich und andere erzeugen kann.
[…] [A]uch andere fassen ihn so auf, und
er  erhält  einen  intersubjektiven
Nutzwert,  ist  im  sozialen  Verbande
geschätzt und schätzenswert als so Dien-
liches, als den Menschen Nützliches usw.
So wird er  nun unmittelbar ‘angesehen’
[…].3 (Husserl 1952, p. 187)
Notice that near the end of this passage from §
50 of Ideas II Husserl observes how intersubject-
ive  agreement  in  the  form  of  reciprocally
shared emotional valuings, and accordingly mo-
tivated evaluations (evaluative judgments), add
a social dimension to the constitution of the en-
vironment.  In  this  way,  the  personal  environ-
ment of an individual subject acquires the signi-
ficance of a social  environment equipped with
3 The English translation is as follows: “I see coal as heating ma-
terial; I recognize it and recognize it as useful  and as used for
heating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth.
[…] I can use [a combustible object] as fuel; it has value for me as
a possible source of heat. That is, it has value for me with re-
spect to the fact that with it I can produce the heating of a room
and thereby pleasant sensations of warmth for myself and others.
[…] Others also apprehend it in the same way, and it acquires an
intersubjective  use-value and in a social  context  is  appreciated
and is valuable as serving such and such a purpose, as useful to
man, etc. That is how it is first ‘looked upon’ in its immediacy.”
(Husserl 1989, pp. 196f.)
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common  objects  possessing  intersubjectively
shared values—in the case at hand: shared use-
values, to be perceived immediately (e.g., as a
piece of heating material). In the following sec-
tion, §51, entitled “The person in personal asso-
ciations,” Husserl generalizes these observations.
He claims that the social environment is relative
to persons who are able to “communicate” with
one another, i.e., to “determine one another” by
performing actions with the intention of motiv-
ating  the  other  to  display  “certain  personal
modes of behavior” on his grasping that very
communicative intention (Husserl 1989, p. 202).
If an attempted piece of communication such as
this, also called a “social act” (Husserl 1989, p.
204),  is  successful,  then  certain  “relations  of
mutual understanding (Beziehungen des Einver-
ständnisses)” are formed (Husserl 1989, p. 202):
[A]uf die Rede folgt Antwort, auf die the-
oretische, wertende, praktische Zumutung,
die der Eine dem Anderen macht, folgt die
gleichsam antwortende Rückwendung,  die
Zustimmung  (das  Einverstanden)  oder
Ablehnung (das  Nicht-einverstanden),  ev.
ein  Gegenvorschlag  usw.  In  diesen  Bez-
iehungen des Einverständnisses ist […] eine
einheitliche  Beziehung  derselben  zur  ge-
meinsamen  Umwelt  hergestellt.4 (Husserl
1952, pp. 192-193)
A few lines later, Husserl even claims that re-
lations of mutual understanding help determ-
ine the common surrounding world for a group
of persons; the world as constituted this way
is called a “communicative environment.” On
his  view,  the  world  of  experience  is  partly
structured by the outcomes of communicative
acts.  If  it  is  structured this  way,  then there
will be meaningful environmental “stimuli,” or
solicitations  (to  use  a  more  recent  termino-
logy), which motivate a given subject to dis-
play  personal  behaviour  that  consists  in  his
reacting  upon  such  environmental  stimuli;
4 The English translation is as follows: “[S]peaking elicits response; the
theoretical, valuing, or practical appeal, addressed by one to the other,
elicits, as it were, a response coming back, assent (agreement) or refusal
(disagreement) and perhaps a counterproposal, etc. In these relations of
mutual understanding, there is produced […] a unitary relation of [per-
sons] to a common surrounding world.” (Husserl 1989, pp. 203-204)
where the notion of motivation is to be under-
stood as follows:
[W]ie  komme  ich  darauf,  was  hat  mich
dazu gebracht? Daß man so fragen kann,
charakterisiert alle Motivation überhaupt.5
(Husserl 1952, p. 222)
I regard this Husserlian conception of the struc-
tures  underlying  our  being-in-the-world  as
highly plausible. So Pacholik-Żuromska kicks at
an open door when she stresses the importance
of (what is nowadays called) embedded cogni-
tion and dynamic mind-world interaction for an
adequate conception of intentionality.6 
4 Some corrections and clarifications
Finally, some corrections. I begin with two mis-
understandings  that  I  find easily  comprehens-
ible. 
First, my use of the term “producer” may
be misleading,  as  it  differs  from the ordinary
use of the term. Not every producer of an utter-
ance, in the ordinary sense, is a producer in the
technical sense that Evans and I associate with
the term. To take up the example that Evans
gives in the long quotation cited at the begin-
ning of section 5 of my article, if someone uses
the name “Livingston” today to refer to (say)
an 18th century politician,  then she will  be a
mere consumer of that name, because she could
not “have been introduced to the [name-using]
practice  via  [her]  acquaintance  with”  Living-
ston, to put it in Evans’ terms (1982, pp. 376–
393). This holds true even if she is the speaker
of an utterance in which the name “Livingston”
is used this way. I do not think that the produ-
cer/consumer distinction leads to a problematic
5 The English translation is as follows: “How did I hit upon that, what
brought me to it? That questions like these can be raised characterizes
all motivation in general.” (Husserl 1989, p. 234; in part my translation)
6 Pacholik-Żuromska also refers to Davidson’s notion of triangulation
in this connection. For a Husserl- and Føllesdal-inspired critique of
Davidson’s  recourse  to causal  concepts  in  this  context,  see  Beyer
2006, pp. 88–99. In the last paragraph of section 4 she draws a dis-
tinction between diachronic externalism— a position she ascribes to
Davidson—, synchronic and social externalism, claiming that the lat-
ter “creates trouble for Beyer” (Pacholik-Żuromska this collection, p.
8). In the light of both the foregoing considerations and her misread-
ing of my view on Searle’s Background Hypothesis (see section 4), I
regard this claim as false. 
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two-tier  society  of  linguistic  insiders  and out-
siders, as Pacholik-Żuromska seems to believe.
It  merely  reflects  the  way proper  names  and
other expressions acquire a particular usage, as
a matter  of  fact.  Actually,  Pacholik-Żuromska
herself  draws  upon  a  very  similar  distinction
(but see footnote 16 in the target article, Beyer
this collection) when she talks  about experts.
Of course, in principle anyone may become an
expert regarding the application of any term—
although it is difficult, to say the least, to be-
come  a  producer  regarding  a  proper  name
whose bearer has passed away a long time ago
(see above). If this latter remark is correct (as I
think it is), then it is not the case that in gen-
eral “everyone can verify or falsify judgments of
others,” as  Pacholik-Żuromska (this collection,
p.  6)  wants  to  claim  following  Peacocke.  In
some cases (such as the case of proper names
whose bearers have passed away) some people—
the  mere  consumers—are  in  an  epistemically
underprivileged position.
Since  Pacholik-Żuromska  mistakenly
equates what I call producers with speakers and
mere consumers with hearers, she misreads my
proposal to tone down Searle’s Background Hy-
pothesis in such a way that only the producers
with  regard  to  a  given  set  of  sentences  need
“background  know-how regarding  the  applica-
tion of those sentences” (as I put it in section 5
in the target article, Beyer this collection), and
her relevant arguments are besides the point—
even if they contain interesting ideas (see sec-
tions 1 and 2 above). I do not claim that the
Background  Hypothesis  “should  be  restricted
only  to  the  speaker,”  as  Pacholik-Żuromska
(this collection, p. 1) puts it in her abstract. I
contend that it should be restricted to the pro-
ducers. 
This  brings  me  to  a  second  misunder-
standing  that  also  concerns  my  view  on  the
Background  Hypothesis.  In  some  places  (like
the last paragraph of section 4 in the target art-
icle;  Beyer this collection) I carelessly put my
view in such a way that it invites the following
interpretation,  which  Pacholik-Żuromska  takes
for granted: only the producers need any back-
ground  know-how.  However,  this  is,  again,  a
misreading, as becomes clear when one looks at
more careful formulations of my view, such as
the one quoted in the preceding paragraph or
the  following  formulations  from  section  5:
“Meaning-intentions […] do not generally require
a non-intentional background  relative to which
their  (truth-conditional)  content  and  satisfac-
tion conditions are determined;” (Beyer this col-
lection, p. 15; emphasis added) “the applicabil-
ity of the Background Hypothesis […] needs to
be  restricted,  as  far  as  the  part  of  the  back-
ground  (co-)determining  truth-conditional  con-
tent is concerned, to what I have called the pro-
ducers.” (Beyer this collection, p. 17; emphasis
added) What Pacholik-Żuromska does not no-
tice, and what I should have made clearer, is
that  I  distinguish between two different  func-
tions of the background:
• On the one hand, some of its elements (such
as personal acquaintance with a name-bearer,
or with a practice like opening a can) help to
determine a particular truth-condition for a
sentence-use and its underlying meaning-be-
stowing act—here I claim that only the pro-
ducers need a corresponding background.
• On the  other  hand,  the  existence  of  what
Searle calls the Network is an enabling condi-
tion for intentional consciousness.
Regarding the latter, I argue near the end of
my article that it is misleading to characterize
the part of the Network that constitutes “the
set  of  anticipations determining” (Beyer this
collection, p. 16)  what  Husserl  refers  to  as
the “intentional horizon” of a conscious inten-
tional state as completely non-intentional, be-
cause they are mental dispositions to form oc-
current higher-order beliefs.  In order to save
Husserl’s notion of intentional yet unconscious
horizon anticipations, which I regard as an in-
dispensable contribution to the theory of  in-
tentionality,  I  propose  that  we  (re)formulate
Searle’s background conception in such a way
that “the background may indeed contain in-
tentional elements, albeit in a derived sense”
(Beyer this collection, p. 17),  notably in the
sense of mental dispositions to form higher-or-
der  beliefs.  The  only  argument  I  find  in
Pacholik-Żuromska’s commentary that may at
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first sight be taken to speak against the ad-
mission  of  such  intentional  background-ele-
ments is the regress argument she refers to in
section 4 of  her commentary. She points out
that  the  Background Hypothesis  is  supposed
to avoid a regress of assumptions such as the
one I describe in section 3 in the target article
(under  the  heading  “Background  assump-
tions”)  in  order  to  motivate  Searle’s  radical
contextualism. But, quite apart from the fact
that I do not claim that  all elements of the
background  are  intentional  in  the  relevant
sense, I find Searle’s corresponding argument
for  the Background Hypothesis  confused.  He
claims that “[t]he actual content is insufficient
to  determine  the  conditions  of  satisfaction,”
and that “[e]ven if you spell out all the con-
tents of the mind as a set of conscious rules,
thoughts, beliefs, etc., you still need a set of
Background  capacities  for  their  interpreta-
tion.” (Searle 1992, pp. 189–190) To repeat a
point I make in section 5 of my article, this is
an  absurd  view  (cf.  Beyer 1997,  p.  346).
Neither intentional content (“actual content”)
nor respective meaning can be interpreted (or
“applied”)  at  all—only  (utterances  of)  lin-
guistic  expressions,  including  formulations of
rules,  can  be  interpreted,  and  the  result  of
this interpretation will be (the ascription of) a
meaning-bestowing act  which displays  an  in-
tentional content that uniquely determines the
conditions of satisfaction.
Here are some further corrections and cla-
rifications. 
I do not take the case of indexicals like
“I,”  “here”  and  “now”  to  show that  “literal
truth-conditional  meaning”  can  be  grasped
even  in  the  absence  of  “the  correct  back-
ground.” Unlike “sentences without established
use” (as  Pacholik-Żuromska aptly calls them;
this collection, pp. 2–3), these examples have
no bearing on the truth of the version of the
Background  Hypothesis  for  which  I  argue.
They  can  be  captured  by  any  standard  se-
mantics  that  distinguishes  between  general
meaning-function  (character)  and  respective
meaning (content).
I do not give any example in which “the
speaker  utters  a  sentence  that  the  hearer  re-
peats,  while  referring  to  another  object”
(Pacholik-Żuromska this collection,  p.  3) than
the one the speaker refers to. In the example
about the yellow apple and the red ball in the
box, the speaker refers to the apple in order to
(wrongly) state that it is red, and the hearer
may figure this out by applying a suitably mod-
ified version of Williamson’s principle of know-
ledge  maximization  (rather  than  Davidson’s
principle of truth maximization). Nor do I claim
that  any  “false  judgment  in  certain  circum-
stances can count as knowledgeable.” (Pacholik-
Żuromska this collection, p. 3) Rather, the un-
modified version of Williamson’s principle is not
applicable in the case at hand.
Furthermore,  epistemic  contextualism
does not only (often) purport to answer scep-
tical challenges to justified-true-belief accounts
of knowledge, but also to other accounts such
as reliabilist theories of knowledge that make
recourse to the notion of the ability to exclude
relevant  alternatives.  I  do  not  distinguish
between  “literal  truth-conditional  meaning”
and  “contextual  respective  meaning,”  as
Pacholik-Żuromska claims in section 3. In the
case of indexicals, literal meaning is not to be
confused with linguistic meaning in the sense
of  general  meaning-function  (character).  The
relevant distinction is that between literal and
figurative  meaning;  unlike  “meaning  as
usage,” figurative (or non-literal) meaning is a
case of (what is expressed by) implicature.
It is misleading to assert that “according
to Searle,  propositional  attitudes  are not  in-
tentional states” (Pacholik-Żuromska this col-
lection,  p.  4).  It  is  true,  however,  that  (like
Husserl) Searle does not conceive of them “as
a  relation  of  being  directed  […]  towards  a
judgment in a logical sense” (Pacholik-Żurom-
ska this collection, p. 4), i.e., towards a pro-
position. Propositional contents are to be dis-
tinguished  from  the  satisfaction  conditions
they  determine  (which  Husserl  refers  to  as
states of affairs).
I  do not claim that “if  the hearer does
not  recognize  an  intention  accompanying  an
utterance, she does not fail to grasp the literal
truth-conditional  meaning.”  (Pacholik-Żurom-
ska this collection, p. 4) Grasping that mean-
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ing  requires,  on  the  part  of  the  hearer,  to
ascribe the intention to express a meaning-be-
stowing act to the speaker. 
I  distinguish  (following  Borg)  between
knowing a sentence’s  truth-condition,  on the
one hand,  and being able  to decide  whether
this truth-condition is satisfied, on the other.
Mere consumers  do know the truth-condition
of  a  sentence  when  they  understand  it,  but
they are unable to decide (in an epistemically
responsible  way)  whether  it  is  met.  Pace
Pacholik-Żuromska,  this  does  not  mean  that
they “have to believe everything they [hear].”
(this collection, p. 5) Nothing in the notion of
a mere consumer implies that he must regard
a  given  speaker  as  infallible  (and  sincere),
even if this speaker is in fact a producer; and
nothing  in  the  notion  of  a  producer  implies
that  producers  are  infallible  (and  always
truthful). Nor does this mean that producers
grasp  truth-conditional  content  more  “fully”
than mere consumers (see footnote 16 of my
target article; Beyer this collection). 
On my conception  of  a  producer,  there
can be no producer who is “a false expert.” It
is possible, though, on my view, to be a pro-
ducer  without  being  a  scientific  expert  on
whatever it is that constitutes the extension,
reference,  or  truth-condition  of  the  relevant
expression (again, see footnote 16 of my target
article; Beyer this collection). 
Pacholik-Żuromska raises  an  excellent
question  when  she  asks  what,  on  my  view,
“would be an indicator of the proper usage of
a sentence.” (this collection, p. 6) However, it
does not speak against a particular approach
to  meaning  that  this  problem  arises  in  its
framework. It arises in any framework. 
Husserl took over the idea of intentional-
ity  from  Brentano,  but  he  does  not  share
Brentano’s  view that  consciousness  is  always
intentional. According to Husserl, there is also
non-intentional  consciousness,  such  as  pain.
Without  intentionality,  there  would  be  no
stream  of  consciousness,  and  hence  no  con-
sciousness. But not every single element of the
stream of consciousness is itself intentional. As
usual, I find myself in agreement with Husserl
here. 
5 Conclusion
Despite  some  serious  misunderstandings,  for
which I am prepared to take responsibility at
least in part, Pacholik-Żuromska presents some
promising ideas. In particular, she highlights the
significance of the background of self-identifica-
tion and the intersubjective dimension of inten-
tionality.  In  addition,  her  commentary  has
helped me to see the need to explicitly distin-
guish between two functions of the background:
its reference-determining role on the one hand,
and  its  enabling  role  in  connection  with  the
functioning  of  the  intentional  horizon  on  the
other.
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